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Abstract
This essay is about the timing of research consent, a process that involves (potential)
participants being given information about, among other things, upcoming research
interventions and then being invited to waive their claims against those interventions
being undertaken. The standard practice, as regards timing, is as follows: (potential)
participants are invited to waive all their claims at a single moment in time, and that point
in time immediately follows the information-provision. I argue that there we’re not
justified in keeping to this practice. What we ought to do is disaggregate the claim-
waiving part of the process and move it later, such that the (potential) participant is
invited to waive her claim against the undertaking of any given intervention only the
immediate moment before that intervention is to be undertaken.
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1 Introduction
In medical research, what generally goes by the name “the consent process” is a conjunction of
two processes: the process by which information about the study is conveyed from researcher
to prospective participant and the process by which the prospective participant waives her
claims against the researcher conducting otherwise claim-violating research interventions on
her. This essay is about the timing of those two processes. Standard practice is for the claim-
waiving process to occur immediately after the conclusion of the information-conveying
process, and for each of the two processes to be carried out in a one-shot manner. However,
the last 25 years has seen a steady stream of commentators arguing that the claim-waiving
process should be temporally extended instead of one-shot.1 These commentators have called
for researchers to require participants, at various points over the course of their participation in
the study, to “reaffirm their consent”, by which they mean reaffirm their waiving of their
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claims. I believe that these calls are on the right track, in that it’s not ideal for the claim-
waiving process to be a one-shot deal, but still missing something important.
I argue in §2 that the research participant should be invited to waive her claim against each
research intervention only in the immediate moment before it is to be undertaken. I call this
process the Disaggregated Contemporaneous Claim-Waiving Process and I argue that it can
fulfil the moral and legal function of a claim-waiving process just as well as can either of the
two kinds of claim-waiving processes just mentioned, in addition to possessing two virtues
they don’t. I intend this new claim-waiving process, and the argument for it, to apply only to
complex experimental studies—studies that involve more than one intervention, where an
‘intervention’ is the researcher doing something to the participant or the participant doing
something to herself at the researcher’s request.
§3 turns away from questions about the moral and legal functions of a claim-waiving
process and toward issues concerning its effect on the psychology of the participant. There I
argue that the Disaggregated Contemporaneous Claim-Waiving Process, if properly carried
out, will do no worse than do the above-mentioned alternatives at focusing the participant’s
mind on the key information about the study, helping her to settle from the start an intention as
to whether to participate through to completion, and, as the study goes on, freeing her from any
feeling of being pressured into continuing to participate. I argue, further, that the process can
be expected to be motivationally inert and that this is a good thing.
As to the one-shot claim-waiving process and the temporally extended claim-waiving
process, by the end of the essay I will have shown that each of them both overshoot and
undershoot the mark. They overshoot the mark by giving the researcher greater legal protec-
tion, at least potentially and in some cases, than we should want her to have, and—at least if
my empirical speculation in §3 is accurate—by leaving the participant, at least potentially, with
a stronger moral motivation than we should want her to have. They undershoot the mark in
virtue of eliciting claim-waiving that is likely to be underinformed. I summarize these points in
§4, the conclusion.
I make my arguments in this essay from the perspective of public policy. I am asking what
practices we should put in place, such that if researchers follow them in their dealings with
participants, then our legitimate interests will be well served. Consequently, in what follows I
will often ask “What should we want?” questions, where the “we” denotes the members of the
public, who have legitimate interests in the behaviour of researchers and participants because
we fund medical research through our taxes, stand to gain from the fruits of its successes, and
constitute the pool of potential research participants. (Since the consideration regarding taxes
applies only to publicly funded studies, my arguments here apply only to such studies.)
2 The Moral and Legal Functions of Claim-Waiving
2.1 An Argument for Contemporaneity
The question of timing that divides adherents of the One-Shot Claim-Waiving Process (OSCP)
and the Temporally Extended Claim-Waiving Process (TECP) is as follows: If a researcher is
to subject a participant to an experimental intervention and doing so would normally violate a
claim that the participant has against the researcher, at what point(s) in time should we want
the participant to waive that claim?
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The longer the researcher waits, before the performing of the intervention, to ask for the
participant to waive her claim against it the more timely that claim-waiving will be if provided,
in the sense of being done in the light of the most up-to-date information about her circum-
stances and her latest thinking about whether the prudential cost-benefit profile of going
through with it is satisfactory and whether going through with it is in accordance with her
other, non-self-oriented, values.2 This leads to the conclusion that, for any intervention, the
participant should be invited, contemporaneously with the performing of that intervention, to
waive her claim against its being carried out.
2.2 Two Virtues of Contemporaneity
Any claim-waiving process that is contemporaneous in this way will have the following two
virtues as compared to the OSCP and TECP:
1) The one already mentioned: it will involve finding out something about the participant’s
mental state at the very moment when it’s most critical, morally speaking, what the
participant’s mental state is. Under the OSCP and the TECP, the participant waives all her
relevant claims in a single moment before (and sometimes well before) undergoing the
first intervention, and therefore for almost any given research intervention she eventually
undergoes it will not be true that it occurs immediately after she waives her claim against
its being carried out. This is one reason why the OSCP and TECP tend to elicit claim-
waiving that is underinformed. Of course, in the case of the TECP the participant is
invited to change her mind after initially waiving her claims, but nevertheless her initial
claim-waiving has a moral effect: it replaces the moral default whereby the later carryings-
out of each of the interventions violates claims of hers with a default in which they don’t.
2) The OSCP and TECP each have the flaw of merging the two parts of consent: the
information-conveying process and the claim-waiving process. They do this in virtue of
treating, as the token of the participant’s claim-waiving, her signing the very document
that serves as the centrepiece of the information-conveying process: the consent form. My
contemporaneous claim-waiving process is constructed in light of a commitment to the
idea that these two processes should be kept separate to the extent possible. The reason to
keep these processes separate is to ensure that the information-conveying process doesn’t
get overshadowed or minimized in importance, thus avoiding a documented problem
(Armstrong et al. 2012) and helping to focus the participant’s mind on the information
provided whenever it is provided. The way we can do this is by building into the
contemporaneous claim-waiving process the further principle that participants should be
asked to token their claim-waiving in some way other than by signing the very document
that serves the information provision function. (In §2.3 I’ll suggest an alternative way of
tokening.) By cleanly isolating the conveying of information from the waiving of claims
we thereby enhance the transparency of both processes.3 The OSCP and TECP each fail
to do this, and their resulting tendency to draw the participant’s attention away from the
2 Dickert, et al. (2017), argue that protecting the participant’s well-being and enabling her to act in accordance
with her values are two of the functions of the medical research consent process.
3 Dickert, et al. (2017), argue that creating this transparency is another one of the functions of the consent
process.
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information provided is the second reason that the claim-waiving they elicit in any given
case is likely to be underinformed.
Having identified these two virtues of a contemporaneous claim-waiving process, we can now
see that any given instance of the OSCP and TECP is likely to undershoot the moral mark in
two ways: 1) being carried out before all the relevant information becomes knowable, and 2)
not being carried out in light of a wholehearted engagement with the information that is
knowable at the time it’s carried out.
2.3 The Onerousness Objection
Thus far in §2 I have been pointing out the advantages of adopting a contemporaneous consent
process. What I have yet to concede, but of course must concede, is that any contemporaneous
claim-waiving process must be disaggregated as well: since the various interventions take
place at distinct moments in time, the participant’s waiving of her claim against each
intervention will have to be carried out individually. This leads to an obvious worry about
onerousness: it seems to entail that the researcher is obligated to seek a written claim waiver
from the participant separately for each intervention. Provided, however, that there are
alternative ways for a participant to waive her claims, this worry is disarmed.4
Fortunately, the postulate that claims can be waived without the use of words, written or
spoken, is a matter of consensus in the literature on consent. This consensus spans the divide
between the two main kinds of consent theorist: those who believe that having a mental state is
sufficient for waiving a claim and those who believe that performing/attempting some
communicative act is necessary. Mental state theorists are friendly to the idea that claims
can be waived nonverbally (Westen 2016: 274, Hurd 1999: 115, Husak 2010: 240–2). And
I’m not aware of a single communicative act theorist who denies that a bodily movement can
constitute a claim waiver; indeed many of them explicitly affirm it (Dougherty 2015: 230,
Saunders 2012: 70–1, Carr 1990, Millum and Bromwich 2018: 49n) and some add that the
absence of a bodily movement, can, likewise, constitute the waiving of a claim (Kleinig 2010:
11, Saunders 2012: 70–1, Upton 2012, Wilkinson 2012: 74, den Hartogh 2011: 303).
Furthermore, I am not the first to propose that certain bodily movements on the part of
research participants be treated as nonverbal claim-waiving; Mueller and Instone (2008:
388) propose the same. Finally, it’s worth mentioning that nonverbal claim-waiving is the
4 A connected, but related, worry is that in advance of each intervention the researcher will need to provide the
participant with information about the risks and benefits of that intervention. In §2.2 I advocated keeping the
information-conveying process separate from the claim-waiving process, but I prescinded from the question of
the timing of the information-conveying. Clearly, though, it would be a problem for me if there were something
important to be gained, morally speaking, from disaggregating the information-conveying process, as that
process would thereby become enormously cumbersome and disruptive. Fortunately, I doubt that there is
anything morally important to be gained from such disaggregation. One might, of course, think that for any
piece of information relevant to a participant’s decision whether to undergo some intervention, φ, it is morally
important that the participant understand that information at the moment when she waives her claim against φ;
this if true would speak in favour of having the information-conveying process, for any given intervention,
happen immediately before the claim-waiving process for that intervention, which would require that the
information-conveying process as a whole be disaggregated. But it is hardly open to a defender of the OSCP
and TECP to make a big deal out of the issue of understanding, as there is a wealth of research demonstrating that
under current consent processes participants understand quite poorly what they are waiving claims against when
they sign a consent form. In any event, Bromwich and Millum (Bromwich and Millum 2015, Millum and
Bromwich 2018) have made a strong case that understanding is not morally important in this way.
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default mode of claim-waiving in clinical practice. The following are examples of how non-
verbal claim-waiving commonly works in clinical practice and couldwork in research settings:
& The physician/researcher says to Jones, “May I swab the inside of your cheek?”. Jones
opens her mouth as the researcher picks up the swab and leaves it open until the researcher
has removed the swab from her mouth.
& The physician/researcher, holding an otoscope, says to Jones, “May I shine this light into
your ear so as to get a look at your ear drum?”. Jones sits still while the researcher goes
ahead with the examination.
& The physician/researcher says to Jones, “May I take a blood sample from you?”. Jones
rolls up her sleeve and extends her arm, palm up.
I take myself to have shown that there is nothing radical about the suggestion, either from the
perspective of theory (specifically, the theory of consent) or from the perspective of (medical)
practice, that certain actions or inactions on the participant’s part be treated as constituting the
waiving of a claim against a certain research intervention being carried out on her. And while I
will not insist, as part of the new research claim-waiving process that I am proposing, that
researchers never require participants to engage in verbal claim-waiving, I do want to build
into it the stipulation that nonverbal claim-waiving be taken as the default. Otherwise, this new
process would indeed be very onerous.
Having fended off the onerousness objection, I can now embrace the disaggregation that
necessarily comes along with contemporaneity.5 For that reason I label the claim-waiving
process for which I’m arguing in this essay the Disaggregated Contemporaneous Claim-
Waiving Process (DCCP).
2.4 Two Legal Inefficacy Objections
My response to the onerousness objection leads naturally to two additional objections.
Defaulting to nonverbal claim-waiving means defaulting away from the use of signed consent
forms, and one might think that signed consent forms secure some desirable legal upshot that
the use of a nonverbal claim-waiving process doesn’t.
2.4.1 A Signed Consent Form as Legal Protection for the Participant
One proposal is that a consent form signed by the researcher provides legal protection for the
participant. The idea would be that if the researcher performs an intervention on the participant
that wasn’t mentioned in the signed consent form, the participant could use the signed consent
form as evidence in a civil proceeding for battery.
The way in which a consent form signed by the researcher would work to the participant’s
legal advantage is by constituting evidence as to what information the researcher conveyed to
5 Given my embrace of disaggregation, it is incumbent upon me to say how finely we ought to individuate
interventions. However, I don’t have a simple all-purpose answer to the question of how finely to individuate
interventions. Fortunately, however, there is an easy rule of thumb available: individuate interventions as finely
as it is possible to without consigning the researcher and participant to labour against impossible-to-meet,
dangerous-to-meet, or pointless-to-meetclaim-waiving requirements. The reason why defaulting to fine-
grainedness should be unproblematic is that the claim-waiving process I’m proposing can be satisfied quickly,
easily and seamlessly in most cases by the researcher’s accepting a nonverbal token of consent.
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the participant. However, in this essay I am making claims only about how the claim-waiving
process should go. The only thing I am saying about the information-conveying process is that
it should be kept separate from the claim-waiving process. If it’s important, for the legal
protection of the participant, that the document that the researcher provides to the participant
by way of conveying information also contains the researcher’s signature, that’s fine by me. I
am insisting only that that document not be thought of, nor treated, as part of the claim-waiving
process.
2.4.2 A Signed Consent Form as Legal Protection for the Researcher
The other proposal would be that a consent form signed by the participant provides legal
protection for the researcher by rendering it more difficult for her to be found guilty of the
crime of battery or liable for the tort of battery.6
To make this proposal more specific, a question needs to be answered: How does a
participant’s signature on a piece of paper need to be conventionally understood and treated
in order for it to provide legal protection to the researcher? There are exactly two candidate
answers to this question. 1) It needs to be conventionally understood and treated as an avowal
of understanding. 2) It needs to be conventionally understood and treated as a token of claim-
waiving. If the objection relies on the first answer, then it causes no trouble for my project
here. Such an objection, if valid, would have implications only for how the information-
conveying process should be structured, whereas I am discussing how the claim-waiving
process should be structured.
If the objection relies on the second answer, then I do need to respond to it, and my
response comes in two parts. First, if in the course of litigation the question arises whether the
participant really did waive her claim against a certain intervention, the burden of proof will
always rest with the prosecution/claimant. This means that the researcher will already begin
battery proceedings from a position of advantage. Should we want the researcher to start from
an even more advantaged position? It’s not obvious that we should.7
Second, if we should—or, more likely, if there are certain rare cases in which we should,
such as in the case of a very high-risk research intervention, because without the added legal
protection most researchers wouldn’t dare to carry out the intervention—then we can act on
that from within the confines of the DCCP by allowing the researcher to demand that the
participant token her claim-waiving in written form.8 My brief here is not against written
claim-waiving; it is against claim-waiving that is not contemporaneous and disaggregated.
2.5 Summary
I have argued in §2 that the DCCP can fulfil the moral function of a claim-waiving process,
and I have shown as well that it can fulfil the important legal functions as well. In addition, I’ve
argued that it has two virtues that the OSCP and TECP lack. Finally, I’ve demonstrated that it
can escape the onerousness objection.
6 I thank Gerard Porter for pointing out this possibility to me.
7 Thanks to Hallie Liberto for pointing this out to me.
8 So long as the document the participant is asked to sign isn’t the same document used to carry out the
information-conveying function.
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In the next section I examine what effect going through the DCCP is likely to have on the
psychology of the participant, and I ask whether any of these effects count as benefits or
drawbacks of the DCCP as compared to the OSCP and TECP.
3 Concerns about the DCCP’s Effects on the Psychology
of the Participant
3.1 Two Initial Worries
One worry about the DCCP targets its disaggregation aspect specifically.9 Whatever might be
said against inviting prospective participants to waive at a single moment in time the various
claims they have against the entire set of interventions constitutive of their participation in the
study, one can at least conjecture that the high stakes nature of that moment serves to focus the
prospective participant’s mind on the risks and benefits of proceeding. By contrast, with a
disaggregated claim-waiving process there is no high-stakes moment (except in those studies
that contain particular interventions that are very high stakes on their own).
However, this objection is undermined by a key fact that I have not yet brought into the
discussion: the fact that nearly every consent form that is used in complex experimental studies
contains, and is indeed required to contain, a boilerplate clause declaring something like, “You
are free to withdraw from the study at any time”. I take these clauses to be conveying in
everyday language the proposition that the claim-waiving that the participant tokens by signing
the consent form is revocable; i.e., that the claim can be reinstated by the participant at will.
And, indeed, researchers act accordingly: they would never force an intervention on a
participant who says that she no longer wants to go through with it, even if that participant
earlier signed a consent form and in so doing tokened her waiving of her claim against that
intervention being carried out on her.
Given this, under the OSCP and the TECP the participant faces a new decision, in advance
of each intervention, whether to reinstate the claim they previously possessed against that
particular intervention being carried out. In a very real sense, then, the OSCP and TECP are
themselves disaggregated. This objection, then, cannot be used to demonstrate that the DCCP
has a flaw not possessed by its alternatives.
Another concern targets the DCCP’s contemporaneity aspect.10 One might worry about the
quality of contemporaneous claim-waiving, given the pressurised nature of making a decision,
in the immediate moments in advance of a planned intervention, about whether to go through
with it. A conscientious participant considering whether to waive her claim against some
imminent intervention might anticipate feeling guilty over refusing to so waive, at least in
those cases in which the researcher has expended time, effort and resources in getting ready to
perform her part of the intervention. Again, however, the OSCP and TECP do not come off
looking better than does the DCCP in this regard. Just as the OSCP and TECP are covertly
disaggregated, they are also covertly contemporaneous. Both of those processes give the
participant the moral power to reinstate her claim against each intervention—a power she
can exercise at any moment up to and including the moment immediately preceding each
intervention. If we should worry that the decision whether to waive one’s claim will be too
9 I thank Lara Jost and Eline Gerritsen for alerting me to this possible objection.
10 I thank Adam Etinson and Jakob Hinze for alerting me to this objection.
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pressurised when the moment of opportunity is contemporaneous with the carrying out of the
procedure that the claim is against then we should also worry that the decision whether to
reinstate one’s claim will be too pressurised when the moment of opportunity is contempo-
raneous in the same way.11
3.2 A Generalizable Lesson
In light of these last two objections and my responses to them, a broader argument in favour of
the DCCP emerges. Because the participant’s claim-waiving, given the OSCP, is revocable,
and because the participant’s initial claim-waiving, given the TECP, is revocable as well,
under both of these processes participants face the decision, separately with respect to each
intervention, whether to reinstate their claim against that intervention in the moments imme-
diately preceding its being carried out. Consequently, there is a sense in which the DCCP
simply brings out into the open and makes official a moral mechanism that the OSCP and
TECP possess covertly. However, by opting in favour of the DCCP we reduce the likelihood
of confusion on the participants’ part (i.e., by making it so that it is only in the immediate
moments preceding any intervention that they are able to exercise their moral power with
respect to that intervention) and focus the researcher’s attention where it ought to be focused
(i.e., on assessing, in the immediate moment preceding each intervention, whether the partic-
ipant is waiving her claim against it).12
3.3 The Matter of Moral Motivation
In §3 thus far we have been focusing on elements of the research participant’s psychology that
are relevant to the quality, and thus possibly the moral efficacy, of her attempts to waive her
claims. I now want to turn our attention to a different aspect of the participant’s psychology:
her moral motivation. I want to admit straight off that I am about to make claims about the
human mind without providing evidence to back them up. I think that they resonate with a
reasonable armchair psychology, but still, if they’re not true then the argument that this sub-
section makes in favour of the DCCP as against the OSCP and TECP must be set aside. In that
case, however, I can fall back on my §2 arguments to the same effect.
I begin with this simple question: Should we want the typical participant to be morally
motivated to see her participation through to completion? As members of the public, we
11 One might wonder whether the fact that the OSCP and TECP are covertly contemporaneous undermines the
first point I made against them in §2.2, namely that the claim-waiving they elicit, in virtue of being elicited often
a long time before the carrying out of the intervention against which the claim is being waived, is generally going
to be underinformed. If the earlier claim-waiving is unimportant, because a later reinstating of that claim is
always possible, then surely the underinformedness of it is unimportant as well. However, as I mentioned in §2.1,
the earlier claim-waiving is not unimportant, as it changes the moral default.
12 Of course, in emphasising the sense in which the OSCP and TECP are disaggregated and contemporaneous,
like the DCCP, I naturally invite curiosity about the prospect of adopting a claim-waiving process that genuinely
lacks those two features—that is, a process that involves the potential participant being invited to irrevocably
waive her claims, at a single moment in time, against the entire set of interventions she is being asked to undergo.
This is not the place to compare the overall merits of that possible claim-waiving process as against the OSCP,
TECP, and DCCP. However, suffice it to say that such a process would face a particularly troubling version of
the underinformedness objection faced by the OSCP and TECP, because under such a process a participant who
has already waived her claim against an intervention would be deprived of the opportunity to reinstate the claim
in light of further deliberation or changes in her circumstances that might occur between the moment of claim-
waiving and the moment of the intervention.
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certainly have a stake in the participant completing her participation, because, as mentioned in
§1, we have a stake in the success of the enterprise of medical research. This stake grows as
ever more resources are sunk into her participation. I don’t mean to suggest, of course, that
moral considerations are the only ones that can motivate participants to see their participation
through to completion. Still, though, it’s not implausible to suppose that there will be
occasions when all other possible sources of motivation fail to do the job on their own. So,
yes, we have a stake in the typical participant’s being morally motivated to see her participa-
tion through to completion, a stake that is minimal at the outset of her participation and grows
steadily towards full strength as she progresses through the various research interventions.
Importantly, the very facts that make it rational for us to care about the participant’s seeing
her participation through to completion also ground a conditional moral obligation on her part
to complete. If a participant squanders society’s medical resources and thus risks delaying the
introduction of new interventions and diagnostics that can augment the quality and length of
people’s lives, and does so for some trivial reason, she surely thereby violates a moral
requirement incumbent on her.13 Consequently, the motivation that (as pointed out above)
we should want her to have is motivation she will have if she’s fully informed and conscien-
tious. A fully informed and conscientious participant’s moral motivation will be minimal at the
outset and gradually grow, becoming quite strong as the final research intervention
approaches.
An important feature of this moral obligation is that it floats free of the claim-waiving
process; the fact that the participant has waived her claims does not help to ground the
obligation. (Indeed, it’s a confusion to think that A’s waiving her claim against B could have
any effect on the moral landscape other than A no longer having that claim against B.)
Consequently, the corresponding motivation will float free of the claim-waiving process as
well.
Given that the moral motivation we have been discussing has nothing to do with the claim-
waiving process, it is worth asking whether the claim-waiving process is itself likely to
engender moral motivation on the participant’s part.
The answer, I think, is yes, if that claim-waiving process involves the participant signing a
consent form. To see why, notice that usually signing one’s name to a document constitutes the
making of a promissory commitment to and thus the incurring of an obligation directed to the
person or group who has drawn up and presented one with the document; we do this when we
sign, for instance, mortgage agreements, rental agreements for goods of various sorts, and
employment contracts. Furthermore, whether signing a document does, in any given case,
result in the incurring of such a directed obligation is purely a matter of convention. There is no
magic language that needs to appear in the document. Granted, some documents make an
explicit statement of their own moral upshot; however, many don’t (they traffic, instead, in
purely descriptive language of “I will φ”, “I undertake not to ψ”, etc) and yet the signing of
them has a moral upshot nonetheless.
Consequently, my conjecture is that despite the fact that the consent forms in use under the
OSCP and TECP don’t mention anything about the participant undertaking a commitment or
an obligation, the signing of the consent form will, for many participants, have a familiar
feel—a feel that is reminiscent to them of how they have felt when signing other forms (e.g.,
mortgage agreements, rental agreements, employment contracts) and will therefore put them in
13 I’m not the first to suggest that under some circumstances it can be an obligation-violation for a participant to
fail to complete her participation; see Schaefer and Wertheimer (2010: 346).
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something of a deontological frame of mind with respect to completing their participation in
the study. This is not to say that they will entertain and endorse the proposition that they are
now obligated to the researcher to see their participation through to completion, but rather that
they will feel obligated or committed to doing so. This feeling is likely to lead to, or perhaps
constitute, motivation to do so.
Notice, further, that in any case in which this moral motivation comes into existence it will
spring into existence at full force at the moment the participant signs the consent form, because
the signing of the consent form will be the sole basis of the feeling and thus of the motivation.
Seen in this light, from a public policy point of view the consent form is a blunt moral
instrument, since at the moment of consent form signing our stake in the participant’s
continued participation is precisely zero.14 Not only, then, is this moral motivation excessive
(since, as we saw earlier, an informed and conscientious participant will be morally motivated,
on independent grounds, to see her participation through to completion), it’s also badly
timed.15
One might object that there’s no such thing as excessive moral motivation on the partic-
ipants’ part; the more motivated they are to see their participation through to completion, the
better, from a public policy perspective. This, however, is not true. If a participant continues to
participate in a study at considerable cost to herself and possibly others, that is not a good
outcome from a public policy perspective. An overly morally motivated participant might, for
instance, choose to see her participation through to completion at the cost of passing up the
opportunity to say goodbye in person to her dying mother.16
In this sub-section I’ve made a supplemental argument in favour of the DCCP and against the
OSCP and TECP. The three central premises in this argument are 1) that an informed and
conscientious participant will be morally motivated to see her participation through to completion,
2) that this motivation will be founded in her acknowledgment of an obligation incumbent upon
her—an obligation having nothing to do with her having waived her claims, and 3) that that this is
all we should want in terms of participant moral motivation. So, it is a good thing that the DCCP is
unlikely to engender any moral motivation of its own, and a mark against the OSCP and TECP
that those claim-waiving process are, by contrast, likely to give rise to further moral motivation on
the participant’s part. The OSCP and the TECP, in this respect, overshoot the moral mark.
Of course, whether real-world participants will actually acknowledge the obligation that the
second claim above posits that they will acknowledge depends on their being given the
relevant information. Consequently, during the information-provision process researchers
14 One might point out, of course, that at the moment of consent form signing it may be that considerable
resources have already been put into the potential participant, in determining her eligibility and talking through
the form with her. This does undermine, somewhat, the claim I’ve just made in the main text. However, it doesn’t
support at all the idea that we should want the participant’s motivation-to-complete to burst into existence at full
strength at the moment of consent form signing. What it supports is the idea that we should want the participant
to begin to feel motivated to continue from the moment she begins exploring, with the research team, the
possibility of participating in the study. How, if at all, we could or should act on this want is a subject for another
essay.
15 Furthermore, if what we did want was for the participant to incur, at the time of enrolling on the study, a full-
force obligation to see her participation through to completion, there would be better ways to achieve that end.
Surely we would also want participants to know that they’re undertaking such an obligation, which suggests that
we should find the most transparent way possible for them to undertake it. And surely transparency would be
enhanced were we to invite them, in advance of their beginning their participation, to sign what would be called a
‘contract’—a sheet of paper containing no information other than a statement as to what the participant ‘commits’
to doing by signing that very sheet of paper.
16 I am assuming that one appropriate goal of public policy is the promotion of everyone’s well-being.
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should feel free to, and indeed should, help the participant to understand the facts that ground
the obligation: e.g., the potential benefits of the research, the resources being devoted to her
participation and the consequences of those resources being squandered, etc.
3.4 Intention-Settling
I said in the previous sub-section that the act of signing a consent form is likely to cause the
participant to feel committed to see her participation through to completion, and I pointed out a
reason why we should be wary of inviting this causal process to unfold. In fairness, though,
participant commitment is in some respects to be welcomed. A commitment, in the psychological
sense, is just a strong kind of intention, and medical studies on human participants would be
nearly impossible without participants adopting the intention to see their participation through to
completion. A world in which participants never form this intention serves no one’s interests. It is
one thing for a participant to be forced out of a study before completing all the experimental
interventions—say, because of a change in her circumstances or because some she has suffered a
serious side effect from an early experimental intervention—quite another for her to quit because
she never had an intention to complete and the next intervention she is scheduled to undergo
strikes her as unappealing. A participant who is just going to quit halfway through should save
herself the trouble and the risk of going through the screening process and the first batch of
interventions. A world in which quitting was the norm would involve a lot of waste of research
funding, and researchers would face a monumental challenge trying to pin down which individ-
uals they could and could not count as being in the research cohort.
So there is quite a lot to be gained from the fact that the OSCP and TECP are likely to
engender in participants a feeling of being committed to see their participation through to
completion. However, this is an ill-gotten gain and consequently it doesn’t count morally
speaking. It is an ill-gotten gain because it is based on participants misunderstanding the moral
contours of the situation they are in—i.e., their feeling that by signing the consent form they’re
undertaking an obligation or at least a commitment.
This, naturally, raises the question of whether we can have the benefits of settled intentions
without the moral costs of misunderstanding. I admit that the DCCP cannot deliver the
benefits, since that process doesn’t encourage participants to think in a future-oriented way
about their participation and thus potentially adopt an intention to see their participation
through to completion. The DCCP focuses the participant’s attention on the intervention she
is about to undergo (should she waive her claim against it), nothing more.
I maintain that instead of relying on the claim-waiving process to engender this intention-
adoption, we should rely on the information-conveying process to accomplish this: we ought
to structure it in such a way as to reliably induce participants to think about whether they want
to complete all aspects of their participation and, if they do, to adopt an intention to do so.
Structuring it this way means the researcher encouraging the participant to pursue this line of
thought and discussing with them the drawbacks, for all interested parties, of incomplete
participation. This dovetails with the conclusion I reached at the end of §3.3.
4 Conclusion
It’s a feature of life in economically advanced, western states with developed legal systems that
an individual’s entry into the most momentous and consequential endeavours of her life (her
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job, her marriage, her purchase of a home, her division of her estate, e.g.) is typically
punctuated by the placing of her signature on a document (her employment contract, her
marriage contract, her mortgage agreement, her will). The thought that a signature is necessary
to make the whole ordeal official or kosher in whatever sense is most salient in the circum-
stances—e.g., in law or in morality—is so apparently common-sensical as to escape notice.
However, one thing of which we do seem to be certain, at least if our behaviour is any
indication, is that a document-signing process is a mark of, and a properly solemn response to,
the gravity of the endeavour being entered in to.
With respect to complex experimental medical studies, it is the very fact about them that
makes them grave—i.e., that they involve participants being subject to different sets of risks at
different points in time by different interventions—that also makes them ill-suited to a process
in which participants are invited to waive their claims against the entire range of interventions
by signing a consent form. By embracing this process, the OSCP and TECP both undershoot
and overshoot the moral and legal mark. They undershoot the moral mark by inviting
participants to waive their claims in advance of all relevant information coming to light and
in the absence of full engagement with the information that is available to them at the time of
waiving, and they overshoot the mark by tending to leave the participant with a feeling of
obligation or commitment that there’s no good reason for us to want her to have, and giving
researchers, at least possibly and some of the time, greater legal protection than we should
want them to have.
In light of these flaws, this essay has advocated, among other things, moving away from
treating the participant’s signing of a document as the default way for claims to be waived in
the medical research context, especially if that document is also supposed to serve an
information-provision function.
We should, however, make this move slowly and carefully; this is because there is a
cynical, opportunistic way of understanding the claim-waiving process that I have advocated
installing as a replacement. One can choose to see that process, the DCCP, as basically nothing
other than the absence of the central element of the OSCP and TECP: the signing of the
consent form by the participant. Whether the DCCP actually amounts in practice to anything
substantive—anything that merits the moniker ‘claim-waiving process’ and serves the corre-
sponding moral purpose effectively—depends on whether members of the research commu-
nity successfully adopt new practices. Researchers will have to get in the habit of looking for
signs of (non-verbal)claim-waiving in the immediate moments preceding their carrying out of
research interventions and will have to be trained on how to spot it. And to reap the full
benefits of the new process, researchers will have to redouble their efforts to communicate
effectively during the information-conveyingprocess—a process that will no longer be
overshadowed by the looming payoff of the participant putting pen to paper. They will have
to learn how to speak clearly, but also in a non-coercive way, to potential research participants
as to what is at stake in their completing their participation once they’ve started it.
The practices just mentioned resist detailed codification. Unlike the TECP and (especially)
the OSCP, if we tried to write up the DCCP in a law or a guidance document we would find
ourselves unable to describe it in anything more than broad strokes. This new claim-waiving
process requires virtue, not (so much) rule following. Researchers will have to develop and
practice new skills and correspondingly rely less on their ability to follow a formula. We
should not discard the status quo claim-waiving process until these new skills have been
inculcated.
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Finally, before closing, it is worth inquiring as to whether the claims I’vemade here, concerning
the timing of research consent, carry any important implications for consent more generally. I think
they do. The enterprise of medical research on human subjects is an institution: a human-invented
practice with defined roles, the occupants of which can change. I’ve argued elsewhere for the
already popular view that when we create institutional roles, we thereby gain a measure of control
over the moral landscape in which the occupants of those roles find themselves, by attaching
specialised moral constraints as well as specialised moral licenses to the exercise of the agency that
those roles make possible.17 This is what made it possible for me to approach the issue of research
consent from the perspective of public policy, asking prescriptive questions about what moral
situation we should want research participants to be in. If medical research on human subjects
wasn’t an institutional practice, the only moral questions that we could ask about it would be
descriptive ones: questions about what moral situation research participants are in fact in.
Consequently, any time we fail to notice, while undertaking a moral inquiry, that the thing about
which we’re inquiring is an institution, we miss out on an opportunity. Oftentimes, the opportunity
missed will be the opportunity to craft a more impersonal moral landscape. From the perspective of
the public—the set of individuals who uphold the institution—typically the salient interest will
simply be that the role-bearers within that institution behave in certain ways.18 If imposing moral
obligations on the role-bearers can help that goal be achieved more reliably, that’s all to the good.
Importantly, though, it’s hard to see why we would ever have an interest in those
obligations being directed—that is, being obligations that one person has to another. The only
things we add to the moral landscape when superimposing directed obligations over their non-
directed counterparts are the trappings of what Stephen Darwall (2006) calls second-personal
morality: claims, accountability, and the possibility of justified reactive attitudes (guilt,
resentment, regret, etc.) when those who are accountable are indeed held to account for
infringing others’ claims. In most public policy domains, very little of this is likely to be
useful, and indeed it might even be a distraction.
Returning once more to medical research, we can certainly understand why the researcher might
want the participant to make a promise, or at least feel as though she’s made a promise, to the
researcher to see her participation through to completion: it puts the researcher in a position, first, to
demand that participants who drop out early or are considering doing so account for their decision,
and, second, to feel justified resentment when these accounts are inadequate or not forthcoming.
Seen in this light, it wouldn’t be surprising if researchers wanted to cling to the practice that
engenders such (feelings of) promissory obligation, namely the signing of the consent form. But we
should keep in mind how trivial this desire is in the context of what the practice of medical research
on human participants is for and what we stand to gain or lose depending on how it proceeds.
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